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Key Messages
•	 Nigeria is in trouble: its oil dependency is not sustain-
able. The country’s oil has lost its competitiveness and oil 
prices tend to remain below its production cost. Nigeria’s 
inefficient refineries are draining public money. Public 
and private debt in Nigeria is indexed on oil prices. The 
country’s sovereign debt rating was downgraded in March 
2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and could be 
downgraded further if low oil prices are sustained as ex-
pected by rating agencies. These circumstances tend to 
compromise Nigeria’s ability to borrow to face the chal-
lenges of the health, economic, and climate crises.
•	 Moreover, the oil industry is now one of the worst-per-
forming sectors in the financial market. Hit hard by the 
current COVID-19 crisis, the industry is affected by pessi-
mistic scenarios on the return of demand and prices to 
past levels, putting oil-producing countries in dangerous 
economic, financial, and political situations. In the post–
Paris Agreement world, marked by the low-carbon energy 
transition, renewables play a leading role, whereas the 
prominence of oil is set to diminish. As the world moves 
forward, the industry is a reminder of the past.
•	 The oil crisis looms large in Nigeria due to the country’s 
heavy dependence on revenues from the sector. Reve-
nues from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) can represent more than five times the country’s 
health expenditure, nearly seven times its foreign aid re-
ceipts, and more than fifteen times the value of the coun-
try’s sovereign wealth fund. Because of the scale of NNPC 
revenues, the Nigerian government’s largest spend-
ing decisions are associated with the oil sector rather 
than the low-carbon energy transition and associated 
public goods.
•	 Various national governments have had differing and ap-
parently mutually exclusive objectives for their national 
oil companies (NOCs): maximizing fiscal revenues trans-
ferred to the country’s treasury; achieving commercial 
effectiveness to extend the company’s oil portfolio; deliv-
ering public goods and services; providing public employ-
ment, infrastructure or energy; or promoting the local pri-
vate sector. The climate change agenda and the COVID-19 
crisis force a reconciliation of these objectives: no NOC 
will be able to maximize fiscal transfers or commercial 
effectiveness without embracing the energy transition, 
which in turn represents the most critical public service 
to be delivered to citizens. Thus, NNPC’s business model 
must embrace the energy transition. 
•	 Other NOCs have taken meaningful steps to become play-
ers in the low-carbon energy transition domestically or 
internationally. Five NOCs, in particular, have stepped 
up research and investment in renewables; green hy-
drogen; and carbon capture, utilization, and storage 
(CCUS) technology, while targeting a reduction of their 
carbon footprint: Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco, Norway’s 
Equinor, Brazil’s Petrobras, Malaysia’s Petronas, and Al-
geria’s Sonatrach. While COVID-19 has hastened Nigeria’s 
oil decline, it also creates an opportunity to advance the 
energy transition, leveraging NNPC as a key player of its 
realization, similarly to Algeria, Brazil, Malaysia, Norway, 
and Saudi Arabia. 
•	 The five NOCs approach the energy transition different-
ly and with different ambitions, and their climate gover-
nance framework is not always clear or elaborated. Even 
so, they have made the energy transition core to their 
strategies. They address the transition risk and seize the 
transition opportunities in a meaningful way, supporting 
their national governments’ commitments under the Par-
is Agreement. 
•	 The five NOCs have also undergone reforms of various 
aspects of their corporate governance. Even if not always 
sufficient, these reforms position them to be players of 
the energy transition.
•	 The Nigerian government has started diversifying out 
from oil, and there are some signs that NNPC is embrac-
ing governance reforms and could help the government in 
achieving its ambition to participate in the energy transi-
tion. However, much more is needed to ensure that NNPC 
uses the energy transition as a business and development 
opportunity. This is an extraordinary task that only a well 
governed NNPC can take up. 
Critical reform efforts should focus on:
•	 Hiring expertise to develop an energy transition plan for 
Nigeria and run an institutional analysis of the role to be 
played by each key public or private institution in the en-
ergy transition including NNPC.
•	 Reforming NNPC to ensure it can play this role, by:
o making NNPC independent from political interfer-
ence at all operational and management levels, re-
ducing opportunities for corruption, 
o enshrining transparency and internal as well as ex-
ternal oversight in NNPC’s governance framework, 
o legally clarifying its funding mechanism and revenue 
retention model, 
o institutionalizing principles of climate change gover-
nance,
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o if profound reform is not feasible for lack of political 
champions inside the government or within NNPC, a 
better avenue would be to privatize NNPC or at least 
some of its subsidiaries. 
•	 Setting up a separate division of NNPC or, in case of NNPC 
privatization, an independent entity with clear objectives 
related to the energy transition that are measured by 
transparent and auditable metrics. This division or entity 
would be in charge of developing a timeline to eliminate 
routine flaring and minimize non routine venting and flar-
ing for existing fields; developing criteria to award new 
fields in accordance with a stranded asset risk analysis; 
and establishing carbon emission standards.
•	 Identifying funding sources for this new division or entity 
in advance and in ways that incentivize desired results.
The current crisis is a moment for reform on which Nigeria 
and NNPC should embark. While it is an incredible policy and 
political challenge, it is not unsurmountable. Other NOCs are 
showing the way, and policy guidance is already out there to 
guide countries and companies. 
Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition 
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1.  Introduction
The fossil fuel industry is in trouble. Fossil fuels are responsi-
ble for more than 65% of human-made global warming, and 
two-thirds of known reserves need to be left underground and 
be stranded.1 While 20 years ago oil and gas companies dom-
inated the financial market, today they are being displaced 
by technology companies, nearly disappearing from the S&P 
500,2 which evidences the decline of the industry. The compet-
itiveness of renewable energy has now been established, and 
the energy demand is on trend to shift permanently to clean 
and modern sources of energy.
The economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandem-
ic is the latest blow inflicted on the oil industry.3 All scenari-
os anticipate that oil price levels will not return to historical 
trends, and some even predict that oil prices will not return to 
pre-COVID-19 levels.
Consequently, Nigeria is also in trouble given its heavy depen-
dence on oil revenues. The Nigerian government cannot rely 
on these revenues to finance its stimulus package to keep the 
economy afloat during the COVID-19 crisis and most likely will 
not be able to rely on them for the recovery and beyond, giv-
en that Nigeria’s oil is not competitive enough at today’s oil 
price levels. 
It is time for Nigeria to embrace the low-carbon energy tran-
sition and diversify out of the oil and gas industry before it 
sinks. The Nigerian government has started to make efforts 
in that direction. In June 2020, it removed the price cap for 
gasoline and associated subsidies4 and established the goal 
to increase renewable energy power generation to 30% of the 
installed capacity by 2030. Also, by 2030, the country plans to 
have 5.3 GW of mini-grids (up from 1 MW in 2015) and 2.8 GW 
of solar home systems (up from 30 MW in 2015).5 
In particular, Nigeria needs to rethink the role of its National 
Oil Company (NOC)—the Nigerian National Petroleum Corpo-
ration (NNPC)—to support this ambition, turning critical and 
challenging times into an opportunity for both the company 
and the country. The government already anticipated this role 
in 2005 by requiring NNPC to open the renewable energy divi-
sion.6 This entity or a separate one with similar mandate, now 
needs to be given the means to play a strategic role. 
Other NOCs have taken meaningful steps to become players 
in the energy transition domestically or internationally. We re-
view the energy transition strategies adopted and measures 
taken by Algeria’s Sonatrach, Brazil’s Petrobras, Malaysia’s 
Petronas, Norway’s Equinor, and Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aram-
co. Their experience can serve as a source of guidance and in-
spiration for Nigeria’s reform of NNPC, even though they must 
also make significant progress to align with the trajectory re-
quired by the Paris Agreement. 
Becoming a player in the energy transition and supporting 
governments in achieving the Paris Agreement will entail shift-
ing the business model of these companies over time, which 
is always a strategic and operational challenge that only well 
governed companies can take on successfully. To this end, we 
also analyze the corporate governance structures of these five 
NOCs and compare them to that of NNPC to draw lessons. 
The current crisis is a moment for reform on which Nigeria 
and NNPC should embark. While it is an incredible policy and 
political challenge, it is not unsurmountable. Other NOCs are 
showing the way, and policy guidance is already out there to 
guide countries and companies. 
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2.  The Low-Carbon Transition and 
COVID-19 Crisis: Hastened Fall of  
the Oil and Gas Sector and Rise of  
Renewable Energies
In 2019, the energy sector—composed mostly of oil and gas 
companies—was the worst-performing one on the S&P 500 
index. In 1980 the energy industry accounted for 25% of the 
index’s value (with 7 out of the 10 top companies being oil and 
gas companies),7 while as of July 2020 oil and gas companies 
accounted only for 2.8% of the index8 (Figure 1). In August 
2019, Exxon Mobil’s weight in the S&P 500 index dropped to 
1%, dropping out of the top 10 companies.9 In fact, no oil and 
gas company remains in the top 10.
Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused an unprec-
edented global crisis, with lower oil prices and, for one day, 
even negative future prices.10 Even after the global economy 
restarts and under optimistic scenarios, oil prices are expect-
ed to recover to pre-COVID-19 prices in 2021 or 2022 at a USD 
50/bbl. to USD  60/bbl. range. Under another scenario, that 
price level will be reached in 2024. In a pessimistic scenario, 
prices do not return to past levels.11 
The oil industry will face a challenging macroeconomic en-
vironment with a predicted decline in global demand for hy-
drocarbons from 2030 onward due to the low-carbon energy 
transition,12 which represents “significant business and credit 
risk” for oil companies.13 Even in the Middle East, where oil is 
low cost and abundant, some governments have made the 
energy transition the strategic priority. Saudi Arabia recently 
tripled its renewable energy target, and the United Arab Emir-
ates launched its “Energy Plan 2050,” aiming to cut carbon di-
oxide emissions by 70%, improve energy efficiency by 40%,14 
and reach a 50% stake in clean energy by 2050.15
Bloomberg NEF forecasts that renewable energy sources 
could meet half of the world’s energy demand by 2050.16 To-
day solar energy represents 2% of global electricity genera-
tion and wind 5%; by 2050 solar could rise to 22% and wind to 
26% (Figure 2). Dramatic technological advances in batteries 
and energy storage accompany this development. Bloomberg 
NEF estimates that USD  13.3 trillion will be invested in new 
power generation assets by 2050, with renewables account-
Figure 1: Oil and gas industry 
underperformance vs S&P 500
Source: McKinsey.42 
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ing for 77% of this investment.17 The main enabler of this shift 
is the radical drop in cost of solar and wind energy, making 
these technologies more competitive than fossil fuels on a 
non-subsidized basis.18 Moreover, new technological advanc-
es, continuous economies of scale, and competition continue 
to reduce the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for wind and 
solar energy. In late 2019, electricity costs from new solar pho-
tovoltaic (PV) plants were 83% lower than ten years earlier.19
Renewable energy investments also provide for a higher job 
multiplier than fossil fuels. Every USD 1 million in spending in 
energy infrastructure generates “7.49 full-time jobs in renew-
ables infrastructure, 7.72 in energy efficiency, but only 2.65 in 
fossil fuels.”20
In a post-COVID-19 reality and with the low-carbon energy 
transition, lower oil prices and the demise of the global oil 
sector, oil-producing countries, including Nigeria, could face 
a dangerous financial situation.21 
2.1. Implications of the Oil Crisis for Nigeria
Nigeria’s oil dependency is not sustainable as the country’s oil 
has lost its competitiveness against international oil compa-
nies and oil prices tend to remain below production costs. 
2.1.1. Nigeria’s Oil Is No Longer Competitive
Approximately ten years ago, Nigeria was among the most 
valuable countries by net present value (NPV) for Shell’s glob-
al  upstream portfolio but today it’s ranked fifth. It also has 
slipped in the rankings for Chevron and Eni and hardly makes 
it to the top 10 of ExxonMobil’s upstream portfolio. Only To-
tal still considers Nigeria among its top three countries for in-
vestment. As a consequence, few of the deep-water prospects 
have been developed. The main reason is related to produc-
tion costs. In ten years, global deep-water project costs have 
fallen by 50% and averaged less than USD  10/boe for 2018 
financial investment decisions. Currently, costs of Nigeria’s 
deep-water pre-financial investment decision projects are 
among the highest in the world (Figure 3).22 
Figure 2: Global power generation mix (1970–2050)
Source: Bloomberg NEF.43
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This decline in investment attractiveness is reflected in the 
latest ranking of the Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC), showing that Nigeria has had the low-
est per capita revenue from oil exports every year in the past 
20 years.23
Oil price crashes due to the COVID-19 crisis could delay invest-
ment further.24 The Nigerian government has changed its orig-
inal benchmark of USD  57 per barrel for the 2020 budget to 
USD 30 per barrel, responding to the oil price crash.25 With pro-
duction costs above the long-term oil price that may stabilize 
around 40 USD/boe,26 Nigeria will see more high-cost project 
shut-ins and the failure of the government’s plan to reach an 
increasing daily production of 3 million barrels.27 Even in an 
optimistic scenario, oil prices will hardly bounce back to cover 
the Nigerian deficit.
Furthermore, Nigeria’s cost structure has alarmed its legisla-
tors. According to Senator Adeola, “while cost of oil produc-
tion in Saudi Arabia is USD 4 per barrel and USD 3 per barrel in 
Russia, it is USD 21.2 per barrel in Nigeria, indicating very poor 
marginal profit of about USD 3 per barrel based on the new oil 
price benchmark of USD 25 per barrel.”28
Nigeria’s capacity to refine and process crude oil also remains 
behind. The country’s refining capacity is significantly low (ca-
pacity utilization at 8.67%) and therefore cannot process the 
oil produced. The country must then import refined oil from 
other markets, putting the national economy at risk due to ex-
change rate shocks.29
2.1.2. Nigeria’s Economy is Dangerously Dependent on Oil 
and NNPC’s Oil Revenues
Nigeria’s economy is dependent on oil, which accounted for 
95% of the country’s exports in 2019. In 2019, oil revenues rep-
resented 52.7% of government revenues.30 
Moreover, Nigeria depends considerably on NNPC’s oil sales 
revenues. In 2013, a high price year, funds collected from 
NNPC made up 74% of government revenues, and between 
2011 and 2017 this number ranged between 45% and 74%.31 
In 2015, NNPC’s sales revenues were more than 5 times the 
country’s health expenditure, nearly 7 times its foreign aid 
receipts, and more than 15 times the value of the country’s 
sovereign wealth fund (Figure 4).32
Figure 3: Nigeria’s Pre-
Financial Investment Decision 
Projects 
Source: Wood Mackenzie, 
2018.44
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NNPC transfers only part of its revenues to the government, 
keeping the rest for operations and investment at its discre-
tion and bypassing the budgetary processes; at the same 
time, NNPC still needs government approval to pay for cash 
calls (see Section 4.1.3).33 NNPC’s reinvestment in its tradition-
al core activities represents an opportunity cost, as every dol-
lar spent by NNPC on oil—rather than being spent by the gov-
ernment on green investments—delays Nigeria’s energy tran-
sition and deepens its oil dependency. Because of the scale 
of NNPC’s spending needs, the Nigerian government’s largest 
spending decisions are associated with the oil sector rather 
than the energy transition and associated public goods.
In addition, public and private debt is indexed on oil pric-
es. NNPC suffers from long-term liabilities accumulated in 
opaque conditions, while by the end of 2019, the oil and 
gas sector “represented about 30% of Nigerian banks’ gross 
loans.”34.A decrease in oil price and the associated closure of 
oil fields represent a systemic risk for the country, at least in 
the short term, until the country’s macroeconomic environ-
ment and fiscal pace is decoupled from the oil price. 
Because Nigeria’s economy is so dependent on oil, Nigeria is 
expected to experience currency devaluation and prolonged 
recession. The oil price slump, the current macroeconomic 
climate, and the pressure resulting from the COVID-19 crisis 
will affect the country’s indebtedness and payment capacity. 
For example, Nigerian banks’ credit profiles are expected to 
worsen as their assets deteriorate with high exposure to the 
oil sector.35
Nigeria’s  sovereign debt rating was downgraded in March 
2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and could be 
downgraded further if the low oil prices are sustained as ex-
pected by rating agencies.36 This compromises Nigeria’s abil-
ity to borrow to face the challenges of the health, economic, 
and climate crises. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has already warned 
that Nigeria “is considerably less prepared to tackle this [oil 
price] slump as gross domestic product has shrunk by almost 
a third in five years. The economy had been projected to grow 
2.5% this year, slower than its population, until the coronavi-
rus tipped it into a likely recession.”37 
Figure 4: NNPC and Nigeria – 
comparison
Source: NRGI.45
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2.2. Implications of the Oil Crisis for National  
Oil Companies
A major challenge during and after the COVID-19 crisis for 
National Oil Companies (NOC) will come from governments 
being pressured to reallocate budgetary resources from their 
oil companies for investments in health, education, and fiscal 
stimulus to reactivate the economy.38 Given that oil revenues 
make up a critical component of national budgets, this pres-
sure is being passed on to NOCs, in particular those that have 
a high cost of production and struggle with low oil prices—
which is precisely the current situation of Nigeria’s NNPC.39 
Even so, a forward-looking government could seize the mo-
mentum to turn the crisis into an opportunity to overhaul the 
NOC’s contribution to the country and turn it into a leader of 
the energy transition. 
Various governments have had differing and apparently mu-
tually exclusive objectives for their NOCs: maximizing fiscal 
revenues transferred to the country’s treasury; achieving 
commercial effectiveness to extend the company’s oil port-
folio; delivering public goods and services; providing public 
employment, infrastructure or energy; or promoting the local 
private sector.40 The climate change agenda and the COVID-19 
crisis reconcile all these objectives: no NOC will be able to 
maximize fiscal transfers or commercial effectiveness without 
embracing the energy transition, which in turn represents the 
most critical public service to be delivered to citizens.
Many national governments are full owners or majority 
shareholders of NOCs that jointly make up approximate-
ly half of global oil reserves.41 If operated efficiently, NOCs 
can help countries ensure a smooth decarbonization and 
play an important role in achieving the Paris Agreement on 
climate change. 
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3.  Energy Transition Strategies of Selected 
NOCs and Lessons Learned for NNPC
This section takes a deep dive into the decarbonization strat-
egy of five NOCs that have stepped up research and invest-
ment in renewables, green hydrogen, and carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) technology while targeting a reduction of 
their carbon footprint: Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco, Norway’s 
Equinor, Brazil’s Petrobras, Malaysia’s Petronas, and Algeria’s 
Sonatrach. While COVID-19 has hastened Nigeria’s oil decline, 
it also creates an opportunity to attain the energy transition, 
leveraging NNPC as a key player of its realization, similarly to 
Algeria, Brazil, Malaysia, Norway, and Saudi Arabia. 
The Climate Accountability Institute ranks the top 20 compa-
nies by carbon dioxide emissions since 1965; 12 of them are 
NOCs, Saudi Aramco ranks 1st with 4.38% of global emissions; 
Sonatrach ranks 18th with 0.91%; and Petrobras ranks 20th 
with 0.64%.46 
Three of the five reviewed NOCs—Saudi Aramco, Equinor, and 
Petrobras—are part of the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI) 
and in May 2020 along with their peers (BP, Chevron, CNPC, 
Eni, Exxon Mobil, Occidental, Repsol, Shell, and Total) reiterat-
ed their commitment to “reducing emissions; implementing 
and scaling-up of innovative low carbon solutions; advancing 
opportunities to scale up commercially viable, environmen-
tally responsible, and safe carbon capture, use and storage; 
and supporting governments as they design efficient policies 
that can accelerate energy transitions.” 47
The five assessed NOCs approach the energy transition differ-
ently and with different ambitions, but they have all made it 
core to their strategies. While their climate governance frame-
work is not always clear or elaborated, they are all addressing 
the transition risk and seizing the transition opportunities in 
a meaningful way. All five NOCs are supporting their national 
government’s commitment to achieve the NDCs. In the sec-
tions that follow, we compare the various elements of their 
strategies to NNPC’s. 
3.1. Climate Governance Framework
NNPC
NNPC’s climate governance framework is uncertain. In 2005, 
following a presidential directive, NNPC opened a Renewable 
Energy Division (RED), with the vision of becoming a leader in 
renewable energy business toward a low-carbon economy. 
The RED was set up with the following objectives: engaging in 
the production of biofuels and becoming a dominant player 
in that business; entering the business of renewable energy 
production; earning certified emission reduction (CER) cred-
its under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDMs); and participating in global carbon emission 
reduction initiatives.48
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
 
The Transition Pathway Initiative (TPI) measures companies’ 
performance in levels of sophistication and effectiveness of 
their climate governance frameworks. In particular, the initia-
tive measures whether a company has acknowledged climate 
change as a business issue (level 1), has built internal capac-
ities to set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and is 
transparent on scopes 1 and 2 (level 2), has integrated them 
into operational decision making (level 3), and has brought 
climate change to the core of its strategy assessment (level 4). 
(See Annex for the complete TPI questionnaire). 49
TPI has assessed both Equinor and Petrobras. The other three 
companies analyzed here—Petronas, Saudi Aramco, and 
Sonatrach—have reported neither to TPI nor to CDP (formerly 
the Carbon Disclosure Project), an alternative framework to 
assess climate governance.
Equinor holds level 4 (strategic level) by achieving the fol-
lowing: setting long-term quantitative targets for reducing its 
greenhouse gas emissions, remunerating senior executives on 
the basis of climate change performance, incorporating cli-
mate change risks and opportunities in its strategy, undertak-
ing climate scenario planning, disclosing an internal price of 
carbon, and ensuring consistency between its climate change 
policy and the positions taken by trade associations of which 
it is a member.50 
Petrobras holds level 3, meaning that it has integrated the 
management of greenhouse gas emissions and of risks and 
opportunities related to the low-carbon transition into its 
operational decision making. However, it still has some chal-
lenges such as supporting domestic and international efforts 
to mitigate climate change (level 3), remunerating senior ex-
ecutives based on climate change performance, incorporating 
climate change risks and opportunities in their strategy, and 
ensuring consistency between its climate change policy and 
the positions taken by trade associations of which it is a mem-
ber (level 4).51
Lacking a detailed TPI assessment, the Petronas Carbon Com-
mitments document provides information on the company’s 
climate governance framework. These commitments include 
zero continuous flaring and venting of hydrocarbon in the 
design of new upstream and downstream facilities and proj-
ects; zero continuous venting and reduction of continuous 
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT  |  13
Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition 
flaring in existing operations when feasible; a carbon price 
in project-decision making together with the option of car-
bon offsets where economically feasible; the incorporation 
of carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technolo-
gies at the design phase for high-CO2 field development; and 
the consideration of adopting renewable energy technol-
ogies in all facilities and projects where operationally and 
economically feasible.52
For Saudi Aramco and Sonatrach, there is little information 
on their climate governance frameworks. For Saudi Aramco, 
more information should become available with its listing 
on the Saudi stock exchange. At the minimum, we know that 
Saudi Aramco acknowledges climate change as a pressing 
issue53 and a risk to its operations.54 Moreover, since 2018 
Saudi Aramco’s greenhouse gas emissions have been veri-
fied and certified by an external party.55 As for Sonatrach, it 
has committed to expand its capabilities in renewable ener-
gies to support the Algerian government 56 and to improve its 
energy efficiency.57
3.2. Addressing Transition Risks
Addressing the transition risk means anticipating government 
policies that will penalize high-carbon content in operations, 
in line with the country’s commitment to the Paris Agreement. 
A transition strategy needs ambitious targets on carbon inten-
sity reduction, ideally aligned with science-based targets.58 
NNPC
NNPC lacks a strategy to address the transition risk and de-
crease the carbon intensity of its production while its carbon 
intensity on scopes 1 and 2 is above the global average (see 
Figure 5). 
While the quantity of associated gas flared decreased from 
2,742 mmscfd or 64% of the produced associated gas in 2001 
to 19% or 880 mmscfd in 2018 (Figure 6), it remains very high 
by international standards—the global average is 1.1%59—
contributing to making Nigeria the world’s 7th flaring country 
in 2018.60 In addition, there is accounting of underreporting 
of flaring.61
Figure 5: Emission Intensity of Oil Production and Processing in Selected Countries
Source: IEA, Oil Climate Index, Carnegie Endowment, Capterio analysis105
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Figure 7 shows the companies that flared the highest volume 
of associated gas in 2018. Many of these assets are under JV 
contracts with NNPC. 
The 178 gas flare sites in the Niger Delta flare around 1 billion 
scf of gas, which could satisfy more the needs of the current 
power generation and domestic industry.62 Therefore, failing 
to eliminate flaring is not only an environmental issue but also 
a missed economic opportunity.63 As the majority equity hold-
er in joint ventures (JV) or concessionaire in production shar-
ing contracts, NNPC should drive the investment to end gas 
flaring. This investment is substantive and means maximizing 
the opportunity of CO2 use in enhanced oil recovery, using gas 
to power current oil fields and developing additional func-
tioning and reliable gas infrastructure in Nigeria and Western 
Africa.64 The Nigerian government set a 2020 flare-out target 
date (10 years before that of the World Bank’s initiative that 
Nigeria endorsed),65 and NNPC and its JV partners might incur 
penalties for non-compliance.66 
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach 
Although all five NOCs analyzed here have committed to re-
ducing their carbon intensity, they do not always have targets 
or ambitious enough targets. All of them do have 2030 as a 
flare-out date; this date has been established by the World 
Bank’s Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 Initiative, that all re-
viewed NOCs, but Petronas, endorsed.67
Equinor’s strategy, even though it is the most comprehensive 
and aggressive one among the NOCs analyzed, is still not on 
par with what is required to achieve the Paris Agreement.68 
The strategy involves targets on reducing the carbon intensi-
ty of its operations and its value chain by 2050. Equinor aims 
to achieve carbon-neutral operations and eliminate rou-
tine flaring by 2030, reducing absolute emissions in Norway 
to near zero by 2050; for the value chain it aims at reducing 
the net carbon intensity from the energy produced to energy 
consumed by at least 50% by 2050 (Figure 8).69 Equinor has 
a company-wide upstream flaring intensity target of 0.2% by 
2020 for the operated assets and a zero routine flaring tar-
get by 2030 at the latest. In Norway’s operations, there is no 
routine flaring.70





Figure 6: Associated Gas 
Produced and Flared, 
2001–2018
Source: Department of 
Petroleum Resources 
(DPR).107 
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In the last decade (2009–2019), Petrobras reduced the volume 
of emissions by more than 40% and aims at reducing its car-
bon intensity even more by 2025 to reach 15 kg CO2e/boe in 
exploration and production and 36 kg CO2e/CWT in refining.
71 
In 2019, Petrobras reduced its flared gas by 12% as compared 
to 2018 and targets zero routine flaring by 2030.72 The carbon 
intensity of Petrobras’s operations is among the lowest of all 
oil and gas companies.73 Even so, as is the case for Equinor, 
this intensity still exceeds what is needed to achieve the 
Paris Agreement.74 
Petronas reduced its carbon footprint by 13%, from 56.50 
million tCO2e in 2017 to 49 million tCO2e in 2018; it aims 
at zero continuous venting by 2024 and zero continuous 
flaring by 2030, while not specifying a target for overall 
 emissions reduction. 75
Sonatrach reported a 2% reduction of flared gas in 2018 com-
pared to 2017 levels, and a 3% reduction compared to 2014. 
The flaring rate is now at 5%, and the goal is to reach less than 
1% of gas production in 2021.76 However, like Petronas, Sona-
trach does not have a target for overall emissions reduction.
Saudi Aramco’s direct and indirect emissions have decreased 
between 2017 and 2018, showing improvement in energy in-
tensity: reductions of 4% in direct emissions, 10% in indirect 
emissions, and 3.6% in energy intensity. The flaring intensity 
also dropped by 4% from 2018 to 2019;77 flaring intensity is 
now at less than 1%.78
3.3. Seizing the Transition Opportunity
All five NOCs are turning the climate change imperative into 
a business opportunity, and three of them—Equinor, Petro-
nas, and Sonatrach—even contemplate shifts in business 
models anchored in strategies to substantially increase the 
share of renewable energy installed capacity in their portfo-
lios. To seize the transition opportunity, NOCs may (1) build 
on their competitive advantages, (2) aim at transforming 
the market by pioneering and demonstrating solutions, and 
(3) dedicate a sizeable R&D budget and venture capital to 
low-carbon solutions.
3.3.1. Building Competitive Advantages
NNPC
NNPC’s RED builds on NNPC’s existing capacity in making 
oil products to specialize in biofuels. It has launched an au-
tomotive biofuel program for the production of ethanol and 
biodiesel that would be blended with conventional fuels and 
has mobilized agriculture crop fields for the production of bio-
fuels.79 NNPC’s RED is also developing plans for on-grid and 
off-grid solar energy PV technology, for deployment in retail 
stations and NNPC facilities. NNPC’s RED is doing data gather-
ing for CDM Opportunities in the Oil and Gas Sector as well in 
the solar sector.80 
Figure 8: Equinor carbon intensity 
reduction
Source: Equinor.108
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Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach 
All five NOCs face the energy transition by situating their com-
petitive advantage and striving to build on it to become com-
petitive during the energy transition While some are already 
becoming strong leaders in renewable energies, others are 
slowly building capabilities in renewable energies and in the 
meanwhile are focusing on improving the carbon efficiency of 
their operations.
Equinor is building on its expertise in offshore platforms to 
become a market leader in offshore wind. To this end, it has 
set aggressive short- and medium-term targets to add 4 to 
6 GW by 2026 (10 times higher than today’s capacity) and 
12 to 16 GW by 2035. Over the past years some transforma-
tional projects include Dogger Bank (United Kingdom) and 
Empire Wind (United States). Dogger Bank is expected to be 
the world’s largest offshore wind farm with a total installed 
capacity of 3.6 GW. Empire Wind, with a capacity of 816 MW, 
will provide wind electricity to one million homes in New York 
City. Equinor is also pioneering with Hywind Tampen, which 
will feature the world’s first offshore oil fields to be powered 
by floating offshore wind.81 
Equinor’s diversification strategy has also aimed at solar proj-
ects, although solar is not the company’s competitive advan-
tage. Equinor has a minority stake in Scatec Solar and is pres-
ent in two solar projects in South America (in Argentina and 
Brazil) but is hoping to grow in the market.82
Petronas seeks to increase renewable energy capacity to 
3,000 MW by 2024, leveraging capabilities it has been develop-
ing since 2012. For instance, in 2012 it developed its first solar 
project by commissioning a 685-kW solar PV system on the 
rooftop of the Suria KLCC shopping mall in Kuala Lumpur, sat-
isfying 30% of the building’s electricity demand. Afterwards, 
it developed a 10  MW solar plant in Gebeng, Pahang, and a 
solar PV system in Arexons in Italy. In 2018 Petronas installed 
solar PV panels at the Pengerang Integrated Complex in Jo-
hor with a capacity of 207 KW. It plans to implement the Solar 
Installation and Application on Petronas Rooftops & Assets 
Nationwide project (SINARAN), with a potential of 30 MWp on 
rooftops of Petronas facilities.83 
By 2030 Sonatrach aims to “develop production capacities of 
electricity from renewable energy; master [PV] energy tech-
nology becoming more profitable and cheaper; and save 
natural gas volumes consumed in electricity by production 
units to direct them toward export.”84 The company is focus-
ing on building a competitive advantage on solar. Currently, it 
spends 2% of its total investments in solar; however, it targets 
to have 80% of its own electricity needs satisfied by solar by 
2030 and plans to expand its solar generation to 4 GW by 2030, 
contributing to the Algerian government’s goal to have 22 GW 
of solar capacity by 2030.85
Already in 2002 Sonatrach, Sonelgaz, and the private group 
SIM created the New Energy Algeria (NEAL), a company with 
the mission of developing and promoting renewable energy 
in Algeria. In 2006, NEAL, in partnership with Abener Energia 
and Holding SVH, set up Solar Power Plant One to operate the 
power plant Hassi R’mel, generating 25 MW of solar power out 
of 150 MW generated by thermal energy. In November 2018 
Sonatrach partnered with Eni to commission a solar power 
plant that will partly power the needs of the oil field of Bir Reb-
ba Nord, saving 6 million of m3 of gas per year. 86 
While Equinor, Petronas, and Sonatrach are already invest-
ing in renewable energies and plan to be market leaders in 
that sector on the domestic market as well as internationally, 
Petrobras and Saudi Aramco are focusing their efforts on im-
proving the carbon efficiency of their operations, while slowly 
building capabilities in renewable energies.
Petrobras’s Business and Management Plan 2019–2023 antici-
pates investments of USD 400 million in renewable energy and 
gas, while allocating USD 500 million to mitigation projects for 
its thermal operations and having less than 1% of its energy 
portfolio (measures in MW) invested in renewable energies.87 
However, in 2019, Petrobras signed a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) with Equinor to develop offshore wind proj-
ects jointly in Brazil, supported by R&D.88 
Saudi Aramco is specializing in CCUS to enhance oil recov-
ery, using the latest technologies to make the solutions cost 
effective. For instance, the Hawiyah Gas Plant captures 30 
million standard cubic feet of CO2 every day, and the CO2 is 
later piped to the Uthmaniyah oil field and injected into the 
oil reservoir to enhance oil recovery. Saudi Aramco is also cap-
turing and taking advantage of wasted energy. For instance, 
it acquired Novomer’s Converge in 2016, a polypropylene 
carbonate polyols product line, to convert waste CO2 into 
high-value materials.89
Saudi Aramco is building its capability in renewable energies 
by equipping its own facilities with solar: it installed Saudi 
Arabia’s first wind turbine at the Turaif oil refinery plant. It has 
a 100,000 m2 carpark solar panel system with a power genera-
tion capacity of 10.5 MW.90 It has also made an announcement, 
prior to the public offering, to dedicate between USD 30 billion 
to USD 50 billion of capital expenditure in renewable energies 
by 2023–2025, making up 1.7% of the total investment that 
Saudi Aramco plans to invest by 2025. 91
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3.3.2. Transforming the Market
NNPC
It remains unclear whether NNPC’s Automotive Biofuel pro-
gram involves a close partnership with the automotive sector 
and downstream markets.92 
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach 
Equinor, Saudi Aramco, and to a lesser extent Petro-
nas and Petrobras are pioneering and demonstrating 
the viability of innovative technologies to transform the 
downstream markets.
Equinor and Saudi Aramco have been working with the indus-
tries combusting the fuel to reduce their footprint through 
CCUS solutions. For instance, Equinor has partnered with 
Shell, Total, and the Norwegian government in the Northern 
Lights project, which involves the pipeline transport and per-
manent storage of CO2 from various third-party onshore indus-
tries (such as cement and waste to energy) in a reservoir in the 
North Sea. Northern Lights is expected to have an initial an-
nual storage capacity of 1.5 million tones CO2. This project fol-
lows the Norwegian government’s ambition to develop a full-
scale CCUS value chain in Norway by 2024.93 Saudi Aramco is 
looking to transform the transportation market by using Mo-
bile Carbon Capture (MCC) technology, which “enable[s] the 
unloading of CO2 at fuel stations for sequestration or recycling 
into other forms of material or energy.” It can capture up to 
25% of the CO2 emitted from a vehicle’s exhaust and store it 
on board the vehicle until offloading. The technology is pi-
loted with Volvo trucks and is targeting 50% of CO2 emissions 
reduction, with 10% coming from improved engine and fuel 
technology (see below) and 40% from the MCC.94
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras and Petronas have worked 
with industrial partners on other solutions as well. Saudi Ar-
amco is working with two carmakers and technology insti-
tutes on developing fuel-efficient engines using the gasoline 
compression ignition (GCI) engine and opposed piston engine 
technologies. The GCI technology is expected to be market 
ready by 2021.95 Similarly Petronas is working with Daimler 
Automotive on low-carbon fuel and carbon efficient engines 
through the use of a cooling lubricant technology.96
While Petrobras is developing biofuels as jet fuels through 
their BioQav product (a jet fuel produced from various sources 
of biomass to be mixed with conventional jet fuel),97 Equinor is 
working on developing hydrogen solutions for hard-to-abate 
sectors. Equinor is partnering with Vattenfall and Gasunie in 
converting Vattenfall’s Magnum gas-fired power plant in the 
Netherlands to run on hydrogen by 2023—the first project of 
the kind in the world.98
Since 2012, Saudi Aramco leads a non-industrial energy initia-
tive to mainstream energy efficiency among companies and 
households—the Lead by Example program. The goal of the 
initiative is to “demonstrate viable energy efficiency solutions 
for other companies and communities to emulate and con-
centrates on  six key focus areas: water heaters, lighting, ve-
hicles, heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), home 
ownership, and smart electricity meters.” Under this initia-
tive, Saudi Aramco aims at reducing its own non-industrial 
energy consumption by 2020 by 35% versus a 2013 baseline. 
As of 2019, it had achieved 90% progress toward this goal.99 
3.3.3. Supporting Innovation in the Market
NNPC
NNPC does not report any research-related activity.
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach 
Looking forward and keeping up with the challenges of the 
energy transition, the five NOCs analyzed have increased their 
R&D investments, partnered with research institutions or in-
vested in venture capital structures. 
Equinor expects to increase its investments in low-carbon 
solutions, renewables, and energy efficiency from 20% to 25% 
of R&D funds by the end of 2020. In 2019 more than 65% of 
these funds went into CCUS and renewables.100 Petrobras’s 
R&D investments focus on renewables and biofuels. Petro-
nas invests R&D in CCUS and fuel efficiency.101 Saudi Aramco 
is partnering with academic and research partners experts 
in sustainable energy, among them are the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT), Stanford University, Imperial 
College, Tsinghua University, the Korean Advanced Institute 
of Science and Technology, and French Institute of Petroleum 
(IFPen).102 Sonatrach partnered with Eni to collaborate in re-
search for renewable energy, and petrophysics, with the Ko-
rean Institute of Industry for environmental technology and 
with ENGIE for solar applications. 
Equinor is investing USD 200 million in small and medium en-
terprises through venture capital funding to support the de-
velopment of new technologies in both renewables and car-
bon-efficient oil and gas. Recent projects include the waste 
heat to power technology that has the potential to reduce the 
CO2 emissions from offshore gas turbines by 15–25%.
103 Saudi 
Aramco’s corporate venture capital will invest USD  500 mil-
lion in renewable energy solutions and energy efficiency for 
oil and gas. As part of Saudi Aramco’s strategic investments, 
it signed an MOU with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 
(ADNOC) and Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based renewable energy 
and sustainable urban development company, to deliver im-
proved performance and efficiency in the oil and gas value 
chain, clean electricity generation, and carbon capture.104
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4.  Analysis of Governance Aspects  
of the Nigerian National  
Petroleum Corporation 
To play an effective role in the energy transition, NOCs need 
to be financially robust and operationally sound. Adhering to 
principles of good governance is a prerequisite to commercial 
and operational success. For this reason, we present in this 
section a comparative analysis of certain governance aspects 
of NNPC109 as well as five other NOCs: Algeria’s Sonatrach, Bra-
zil’s Petrobras, Malaysia’s Petronas, Norway’s Equinor, and 
Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco. 
Our analysis is guided by the principles set out in the Natural 
Resource Charter Benchmarking Framework (Benchmarking 
Framework), a tool for benchmarking various aspects of a 
country’s performance on managing its extractives resources 
against global best practices.110 The analysis focuses on Pre-
cept 6 of Benchmarking Framework; by examining the man-
dates, missions, and governance and operating models of the 
NOCs, we aim to draw lessons that could be applied to im-
prove the governance of NNPC.
4.1. SOE role and funding. Does the government 
clearly define the SOE’s role and establish 
a working funding mechanism for the 
company? (Precept 6.1)
4.1.1. Commercial role. Does the government clearly 
define a commercial role for the SOE that reflects the 
company’s actual financial and technical capacity? 
(Precept 6.1.1)
NNPC
NNPC is a vertically integrated wholly state-owned enterprise 
through which the Federal Republic of Nigeria participates in 
the oil and gas industry. NNPC has few limits on the commer-
cial activities it is authorized to engage in. The NNPC Act 1977 
describes the entity as being empowered to take part in “all” 
commercial activities that relate to the petroleum sector.111 
NNPC has exercised its commercial mandate in accordance 
with various objectives over time, including: to participate as 
an operator, to invest in order to increase reserves, to increase 
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oil and gas production in the country, and to maximize Nige-
rian employment and local service company content. Howev-
er, it is not clear that other important objectives have been 
or are being considered, including those designed to max-
imize the rate of return to NNPC’s investments, to maximize 
or smooth government revenues, to reduce imports of refined 
products, to minimize safety and environmental risks, protect 
community and consumer safety, and reduce pollution and 
carbon emissions.112 
NNPC’s broad discretion to determine the contours of its com-
mercial mandate has led to the creation of 17 wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, 16 partially-owned subsidiaries or associated 
companies, and 7 corporate service units that engage in activ-
ities that span the oil and gas value chain, including explora-
tion and production, gas development, refineries, petroleum 
products and gas transportation, and distribution to retail.113 
Beyond the oil and gas value chain, NNPC has subsidiaries 
that focus on renewable energy, healthcare provision, real es-
tate investment, among others.114 
NNPC’s subsidiaries vary in their performance. The Nigerian 
Petroleum Development Company, which drives NNPC’s core 
business of exploration and production, is considered one 
of the most profitable areas of the business,115 while down-
stream, NNPC’s refineries—Port Harcourt Refinery, Warri Re-
finery, and Kaduna Refinery—consistently underperform, face 
high maintenance issues and operate at tremendous loss.116 
Similarly, NNPC’s Crude Oil Marketing Division, which is in 
charge of crude oil sales, is beset with governance challenges 
that undermine the government’s ability to maximize revenue 
from oil sales (Figure 9).117 The variable performance of NNPC’s 
subsidiaries may be reflective of each subsidiaries’ financial 
and technical capacity to carry out its assigned activities.118 
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
In the international NOCs analyzed as follows, there is a de-
gree of political control as well as non-commercial roles. 
Even so, all five governments are at least formally committed 
to the policy that the NOCs are to be run as enterprises with 
profit-seeking objectives and to be provided with substantial 
administrative, commercial, technical, and operational deci-
sion-making autonomy. All five NOCs are vertically integrated, 
engage in activities associated with international oil compa-
nies, lead the oil and gas sector in their respective domestic 
markets, and some of them (namely, Equinor, Petrobras, and 
Petronas) operate in a number of countries other than their 
respective home states, resembling private international 
oil companies.119
Originally established in 1936 as a private company, Saudi 
Aramco became a NOC wholly owned by the government in 
1980, after a process of increasing participation acquisitions 
by the Saudi government.120 It operates as a joint-stock com-
pany since 2018,121 when the government offered 1.5% of the 
company’s share capital for sale in the public market.122 Saudi 
Aramco is the world’s largest integrated oil and gas compa-
ny123 and the “most valuable publicly traded company in his-
tory.”124 Even though it is subject to a degree of political inter-
ference, it operates with substantial financial and operational 
autonomy and “on an essentially technocratic basis with deci-
sions being made on the basis of commercial, economic, and 
technical criteria.”125
The Brazilian government created Petrobras in 1953 as a ma-
jority state-owned joint-stock company, granting it a nation-
al monopoly in the exploration, production, refining, and 
transportation of petroleum.126 Private equity participation 
was aimed at guaranteeing a certain level of capitalization.127 
Petrobras was not created to be a source of fiscal resources 
to the government or to make available politically oriented 
services such as local employment.128 Initially operating the 
importation of crude oil for local refining and distribution,129 
Petrobras developed Brazil’s oil industry practically from 
scratch.130 Since a 1995 constitutional amendment allowing 
private participation in all levels of the oil industry,131 Petro-
bras is subject to domestic and foreign competition. Based on 
a core strategic decision, the company has developed a long-
term comparative advantage in deep-water exploration, be-
coming a world leader in the segment.132
In 1963, the Algerian government created Sonatrach as a state-
owned commercial company responsible for the transporta-
tion and marketing of hydrocarbons, extending its mandate 
in 1966 to the exploration, production, and transformation 
of oil products. Sonatrach’s exploration and development ef-
forts have made it a global leader in oil and gas exploration; 
through joint ventures and other strategies, it has diversified 
and expanded internationally.133 
Norway created Statoil (currently Equinor) in 1972 with 100% 
state ownership. Since its inception, the Norwegian govern-
ment’s plan was for Equinor to be autonomous in business 
matters,134 as a cost-effective and commercially operated 
entity.135 Its partial privatization in 2001, permitting the sale 
of shares totaling up to one-third of the company’s value,136 
was intended to give the company added flexibility and to 
strengthen its ability to compete internationally.137 Equinor is 
currently a public limited company 67% owned by the state. 
Its relationship with the state is conducted at arm’s length. It 
was neither granted a monopoly nor burdened with excessive 
fiscal or non-core non-commercial obligations. 
Malaysia established Petronas in 1974 as a public limited cor-
poration with commercial objectives, and ownership of and 
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exclusive rights over Malaysia’s hydrocarbon resources. There 
is no indication that it receives differential tax treatment com-
pared to private oil companies. Petronas is a business with 
profit as a prime objective.138 It has taken a strategic decision 
to expand abroad, especially to markets perceived by other 
companies as risky.
4.1.2. Non-commercial roles. Does the government clearly 
define the company’s non-commercial roles?  
Does this definition limit conflicts of interest? 
(Precept 6.1.2)
NNPC
NNPC engages in commercial, regulatory, and policy func-
tions, without clearly delineating between commercial and 
non-commercial roles.139 Its multiple roles creates significant 
conflicts of interest, and researchers report that this results in 
NNPC operating “as though it is above being regulated.”140 The 
Department of Petroleum Resources has relied on NNPC’s su-
perior technical capacity to inform policy and regulatory deci-
sions, which facilitates NNPC’s significant influence over poli-
cy making.141 In addition, NNPC engages in a quasi-fiscal role. 
For example, a 2014 audit of NNPC’s oil sales revealed qua-
si-fiscal expenditure including loans to foreign governments, 
payments for a presidential helicopter, and payments for 
World Cup–related travel.142 Moreover, NNPC has been tasked 
with the non-commercial role of promoting local content in 
the oil sector. This has resulted in NNPC using its position in JV 
joint management meetings to influence budgeting decisions 
to award contracts to Nigerian sub-contractors.143
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach 
While commercially oriented, all five NOCs analyzed also per-
form or have historically performed non-commercial roles. 
Among these, regulatory roles include licensing, setting per-
formance standards, ensuring legal compliance of other com-
panies, and approving their exploration and production deci-
sions. Quasi-fiscal roles performed by NOC include servicing 
national debt, providing infrastructure and public services 
such as health and education, and granting fuel subsidies.144 
Non-commercial roles may not always be clearly articulat-
ed, in cases such as those of Saudi Aramco, Petronas, and 
Sonatrach. Even so, to the extent they were mandated with 
non-commercial roles, the reviewed NOCs have leveraged 
these national policy objectives to develop international 
comparative advantages (for example: expertise in deep-wa-
ter fields for Petrobras). Following international best practic-
es, all reviewed NOCs but Petronas have transitioned out of 
the regulatory roles given to them historically. They have also 
generally succeeded in operating independently from gov-
ernment interference, although recent conflict of interest and 
corruption cases in which Petrobras was implicated cannot be 
ignored.
Although Equinor has been a commercially-driven enterprise 
from its inception, between 1972 and 1981 it assumed func-
tions of managing the state’s equity interest in oil and gas li-
censes and pipelines and serving as a conduit for economic 
development, including through technology transfer145 and 
local content requirements.146 This non-commercial role was 
phased out in 1985, with the creation of a separate entity—
Statens Direkte Økonomiske Engagement (State’s Direct Fi-
nancial Interest [SDFI])—to acquire most of the Norwegian 
state’s interest in production licenses.147 Norway removed this 
role from Equinor and partially privatized it in 2001 to give the 
company greater flexibility and ability to compete interna-
tionally.148 The relationship between Equinor and the govern-
ment is a distant one between the company as a government 
entity and revenue generator, and changing political goals.149 
Equinor is said to be free from pressures faced by many oth-
er NOCs, both in terms of the non-commercial activities that 
the company has to directly engage in and a continual adjust-
ment of the company’s strategy to conform to shorter-term 
domestic policy goals.150 
Besides the objective to obtain commercial success, Saudi Ar-
amco has also had the objective of supporting the Saudi na-
tional mission—including ensuring the survival of the Al Saud 
ruling family, seeking economic prosperity for political stabil-
ity, and providing financial levers to sustain the government’s 
legitimacy. Saudi Aramco’s managers seek projects that can 
achieve commercial success and generate social benefits, but 
this approach has generated tension at times, when the Saudi 
government sought to maximize social benefit at the expense 
of commercial success.151
The Brazilian government originally tasked Petrobras with 
the goal of achieving self-sufficiency in both oil production 
and refining capacity.152 More recently, Brazil’s federal govern-
ment sought greater security of supply and directed Petrobras 
to explore in Brazil’s deep offshore Campos basin. Petrobras 
has been commercially profitable and internationally com-
petitive while also responding to the government’s national 
security mandates. When Petrobras was partially privatized 
in 1997, the government established the National Petroleum 
Agency to take over many of the non-commercial regulatory 
roles performed by the company.153 At the same time, Petro-
bras provides a cautionary lesson in government interference. 
It was also put under pressure to spend in non-core areas 
and subsidize fuels.154 The Operation Car Wash bribery scan-
dals resulted in former Brazilian president Ignacio Lula Da 
Silva being convicted and imprisoned for bribery schemes; 
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Petrobras was implicated in these schemes and was fined by 
U.S. authorities.155 
Petronas is a business with profit as a prime objective and 
has remained relatively independent of the government in its 
day-to-day operations.156 However, the company has conduct-
ed non-commercial activities. It acts as an industry regulator 
and is the exclusive owner and grantors of licenses to the pri-
vate sector.157 It also has quasi-fiscal activities such as being a 
private banker for the government by acquiring interests in a 
shipping company and a national carmaker, or a property de-
veloper in building the Petronas Towers and the administra-
tive capital of Putrajaya.158 It has often translated these policy 
objectives into commercial opportunities. For example, when 
Malaysia’s petroleum fields were maturing in the 1990s, the 
government’s desire to guarantee security of supply resulted 
in Petronas expanding overseas.159 
Sonatrach’s responsibilities grew in the 1960s and 1970s, as Al-
geria’s oil assets abroad were nationalized, and the company 
operated as the instrument of the Algerian state’s monopoly of 
gas and transport of hydrocarbons. However, the company’s 
direct control of these assets was reduced in the 1980s, being 
spun off to subsidiaries. In 2005, new legislation liberalized 
the oil and gas sector, revoking Sonatrach’s monopoly over 
upstream activities (even though a minimum participation of 
Sonatrach at 51% is still required), and creating independent 
regulatory bodies—the National Agency for the Valorization 
of Hydrocarbon Resources (ALNAFT) and the Hydrocarbons 
Regulatory Authority (ARH). These two bodies took over Sona-
trach’s regulatory and licensing roles, and Sonatrach main-
tains its status as an operator only. Foreign partners in pro-
duction contracts with Sonatrach no longer collect their taxes 
with Sonatrach as an intermediate, now paying them directly 
to ALNAFT.160 However, the company contributes to Algeria’s 
low RGI score in reporting on non-commercial activities,161 
and allegations of corruption have damaged the company in 
recent years.162
4.1.3. Funding mechanism. Does the government ensure 
that the SOE has a workable funding mechanism? 
(Precept 6.1.3)
NNPC
The level of budget and financial autonomy is among the 
indicators of workable funding mechanisms in NOCs. Based 
on these factors, NNPC is not considered to have a workable 
funding mechanism that allows predictable and sufficient 
revenue flows to fund its operations, though there have been 
improvements in recent years.163 
In terms of budget autonomy, the board of directors’ de-
cision-making powers are subject to presidential/cabinet 
approval, and the board has limited and circumscribed de-
cision-making power on financial matters.164 Indeed, NNPC 
is amongst the group of NOCs that transfer the most to the 
government, with low retention of revenues. Based on pub-
licly available data for 2011–2014, NNPC transferred an aver-
age of USD 50 per barrel to the government.165 However, due 
to unclear accounting of revenues and the network of NNPC 
subsidiaries with some of them sitting offshore, the accurate 
amount of NNPC’s accumulated revenues remains unknown 
to the public. In addition, there are no clear rules of transfer 
Table 1: NOCs, Achievement of Goals, and Regulatory and Fiscal Roles
Company achievement of 











Saudi Aramco No Yes
Petrobras No Yes
Petronas Yes Yes
Medium Sonatrach No Yes
Low NNPC Yes Yes
Source: Prepared by the authors based on NRGI.269
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of revenues to the government as a legal conflict remains be-
tween section 162 of Nigeria’s Federal Constitution of 1999, 
on the one hand, which requires all government-collected 
revenues to enter the Federation Account, and section 7 of the 
NNPC Act of 1977 on the other, which allows the corporation 
to maintain a “fund” to finance its activities, without further 
specification.166 As such, NNPC has interpreted this rule over 
the years with little effect in improving its ability to perform. 
For example, once clear source of revenue waste and ineffi-
ciency is the Domestic Crude Allocation (DCA). Every day, the 
Nigerian government allocates 445,000 barrels to NNPC for 
sales to the domestic refineries through its subsidiary, the 
Pipelines and Product Marketing Company (PPMC). Because 
the four Nigerian refineries can only process around 100,000 
barrels per day, NNPC reroutes most of the DCA to the export 
market or petroleum for product swaps. NNPC then exerts dis-
cretionary withholding on these export revenues to finance its 
activities with the percentage being sent to the federal level 
varying from year to year (for example, it was 73% in 2004 and 
58% in 2012).167
NNPC has also consistently struggled to meet its JV cash call 
obligations.168 Previously, the Nigerian government managed 
funds relating to upstream joint venture petroleum opera-
tions and NNPC’s equity share of a JV and funded cash calls 
by means of annual budget appropriation.169 The federal gov-
ernment no longer funds cash calls directly; instead, they are 
now funded by aggregate revenues from NNPC’s “subsidiaries 
and business units, deductions from oil revenue due to the 
federation, and third-party financing for approved projects 
to finance its operations.”170 This aggregation of revenues oc-
curs in the absence of clear rules and outside of the formal 
budgeting process.171 
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
 
All five international NOCs play a sophisticated commercial 
role with financing needs associated with large-scale invest-
ment. Appropriately they all retain a moderate to high level 
of autonomy on revenues to finance their activities and have 
considerable autonomy and decision-making power on fi-
nancial, budgetary, and investment matters while being sub-
mitted to strong oversight and reporting mechanisms (see 
Precepts 6.2.2 and 6.3). Most of the NOCs (Petrobras, Petro-
nas, Equinor, and Saudi Aramco) are listed on stock exchang-
es,172 and some (Petrobras, Petronas, and Equinor) can issue 
bonds in the international financial market to finance their 
capital expenditures.173
Equinor has a general policy to keep a liquidity reserve, as well 
as committed, unused credit to ensure that it has sufficient 
financial resources to meet short-term requirements.174 It fi-
nances its capital expenditures both internally and external-
ly.175 The long-term funding of Equinor is raised when a need is 
ascertained for such financing based on its business activities, 
cash flows, and required financial flexibility or when market 
conditions are considered to be favorable.176 
Petrobras is allowed to retain much of the oil revenue177 and 
has a degree of financial autonomy,178 although it is required 
to submit its proposed annual budget to the Ministry of Econ-
omy and the Ministry of Mines and Energy for review,179 and 
to the Brazilian Congress for approval. The Brazilian govern-
ment controls Petrobras’s budget and establishes limits on its 
investments and long-term debt.180 Petrobras is required to 
maintain a legal reserve, to which it must allocate 5% of net 
income for each fiscal year until the amount for such reserve 
equals 20% of its paid-in capital.181 
Petronas retains profits on earnings, paying royalties and tax-
es like international companies;182 it also pays high dividends 
to the State and does not obtain funds from the national trea-
sury.183 Some have criticized this revenue retention model as 
being too onerous on Petronas, with the dividend payout ra-
tio sometimes reaching 74% in addition to other taxes.184 Its 
board of directors decides upon bond sales, and there are no 
official restrictions on borrowing.185 
Saudi Aramco has an all-inclusive and disciplined internal 
approval process for capital expenditures, new projects, and 
debt incurrence.186 It controls its own operating revenue,187 
which is the primary source of funding for its activities,188 and 
evaluates future projects based on strategic, operational, 
commercial and financial targets. The company’s unique re-
serves and resources base, operational flexibility, field man-
agement, and strong cash-flow generation serve as a founda-
tion for its low gearing and flexibility to allocate capital.189 The 
board of directors obtains loans, issues bonds, and enter into 
other financing instruments on behalf of the company.190 Ac-
cordingly, Saudi Aramco enjoys comfortable financial operat-
ing conditions,191 even if the Saudi Government relies on Saudi 
Aramco for a significant portion of its revenue.192
Sonatrach is, among the five analyzed, the NOC that retains 
the least of its revenues to finance its activities, transferring 
roughly 60% of its revenues to the government.193 It relies 
heavily on international partners for funding and expertise to 
conduct its operations, and in recent years it is facing difficul-
ties to attract foreign investors given low oil and gas prices, 
political protests and security risks in Algeria, and increased 
competition. A 2019 amendment to the hydrocarbon law aims 
at restoring the attractiveness of the country’s oil sector to 
foreign investment by improving contract terms and reducing 
the tax burden on Sonatrach and its international partners 
from 85% to 60%–65%.194
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4.2. SOE corporate governance. Do the SOE’s 
corporate governance systems limit 
political interference in the company’s 
technical decisions, while ensuring effective 
oversight? (Precept 6.2)
4.2.1. Role of state shareholders. Does the government 
clearly establish the identity and role of state 
shareholders in the SOE? (Precept 6.2.1)
NNPC
NNPC is a wholly owned state enterprise, and the President 
of Nigeria exercises decision-making power, with few checks 
and balances to temper political interference in NNPC’s oper-
ations.195 For example, NNPC is granted limited powers to con-
tract and spend, a role typically exercised through operational 
units.196 Approving power in these matters is concentrated in 
the president.197 In general, there are reportedly high levels 
of political interference in NNPC’s operations, including in 
the discretionary allocation of licensees, crude oil lifting con-
tracts, fuel importation contracts, and in the appointment of 
senior employees.198
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach 
All five international NOCs analyzed provide clarity on the 
identity and role of state shareholders. In some of them—no-
tably Equinor but also Petrobras, Petronas, and Saudi Aramco 
to a large extent—corporate governance systems are in place 
that limit political interference in the company and ensure 
effective oversight. In turn, Sonatrach operates with a lower 
degree of independence from the government. 
Petrobras’s bylaws provide that it is a mixed-capital company 
controlled by Brazil’s Federal Government, for an indefinite 
term.199 The bylaws indicate that the government may guide 
the activities of Petrobras “to contribute to the public inter-
est that justified its creation, aiming at meeting the objective 
of the national energy policy,”200 as long as certain conditions 
are met: policy objectives are required by law or regulation 
and provided for in a contractual arrangement; costs and 
revenues of investment projects to achieve such objectives 
are broken down and disclosed; and the obligations and re-
sponsibilities assumed by the company abide by specified 
market conditions.201
As regards Equinor, the Norwegian State’s ownership policy 
is that the principles in the Norwegian Code of Practice for 
Corporate Governance will apply to State ownership. The Nor-
wegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) manages the 
State ownership interest in Equinor. The MPE will customarily 
decide how the Norwegian State will vote on proposals sub-
mitted to general meetings of the shareholders.202 
Since Saudi Aramco became an NOC, successive Saudi kings 
and governments have protected its commercial culture and 
shielded its day-to-day operations from undue political inter-
ference. Even if ultimate control of the company lies with the 
ruling family, a sophisticated system of public administration 
has delegated authority in practice. The Supreme Council on 
Petroleum and Mineral Affairs (SCPMA)—composed of the 
king, the crown prince, eight ministers, and the CEO of Saudi 
Aramco—formally regulates the oil sector and oversees Saudi 
Aramco’s activities. In practice, SCPMA’s supervisory role has 
been minimal, simply endorsing the decisions made by Saudi 
Aramco’s board of directors and trusting that the company’s 
strategy will align with the country’s goals. 203
The Prime Minister’s office is the sole shareholder in Petronas 
and collects annual dividends and taxes from the company.204 
Although the management of Petronas has a close relation-
ship the Malaysian government, particularly the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office, Prime Ministers have usually been careful not to 
appear to be too deeply involved in day-to-day activities of 
the company. In part, there is recognition that the appearance 
of an overly interfering government would have a negative ef-
fect on world markets. At the same time, it is to be expected 
that when the national interest is paramount or there is need 
to tap into the financial resources of Petronas, there will be 
state involvement.205 
Sonatrach is formally a joint-stock company but in practice a 
public company wholly owned and tightly controlled by the 
Algerian government.206 While striving to ensure that Sona-
trach performed efficiently, the Algerian government has 
maintained financial, administrative, and legal control and 
influence over the company’s revenues and operations, often 
undercutting its performance.207 Since the restructuring of the 
company in 1998, its General Assembly—chaired by the Minis-
try of Energy and Mines—reports to the National Energy Coun-
cil (NEC), which oversees the country’s energy policy agenda 
and holds operational and legal control over Sonatrach, even 
if not involved in its daily operations. The NEC is headed by 
the Algerian president and includes as members the central 
bank governor, a representative of the Presidency, and three 
leading ministers.208
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4.2.2. Board models. Does the SOE have an empowered, 
professional and independent board? (Precept 6.2.2)
NNPC
The NNPC Act stipulates that NNPC’s board consists of a chair-
person, the Director-General of the Federal Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development, the managing director of NNPC, 
and three people appointed by the National Council of Min-
isters based on their ability, experience or specialized knowl-
edge of the oil industry or of business or professional attain-
ments and can make useful contributions to the work of NN-
PC.209The majority of NNPC’s directors are not independent of 
the government. The Minister of Petroleum Resources, a role 
currently held by the President, is specified by the Act as the 
chairperson of the board,210 and the board operates mainly at 
direction of the President. 
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
All international NOCs analyzed are professionally run by 
technically competent management, following corporate 
governance structures and practices comparable to the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance.211 However, in Sonatrach, 
Petrobras, Petronas, and Saudi Aramco, there are government 
representatives in the boards of directors, the CEO is appoint-
ed by the government, and a board member may also be CEO. 
The involvement of government officials weakens the inde-
pendence of the NOCs’ boards of directors, which should be 
composed of members selected based on their technical ex-
pertise rather than political considerations.212
The work of the governing bodies in Equinor is based on a 
well-defined separation of roles and responsibilities between 
the shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Manage-
ment.213 The Board of Equinor is independent of the Manage-
ment of the Company.214 The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
Equinor is appointed by the Board who also stipulates his/
her salary.215 The board of directors consists of nine to eleven 
members. The corporate assembly are required to elect Board 
of directors, including the chair and the deputy chair for up to 
two years.216 The State has no appointed board members or 
members of the Corporate Assembly in Equinor.217 The Norwe-
gian Company Law stipulates that the company’s employees 
are represented by three Board members. The Members of the 
Board elected by the employees have three deputy members 
who attend board meetings in the event an employee-elect-
ed member of the board is unable to attend. The other Board 
members elected by other shareholders do not have deputy 
members. The management is not represented on the Board 
of Directors.218 
As regards Saudi Aramco, the Saudi Kingdom is required to di-
rectly nominate six candidates for election to the membership 
of the board of directors, while the other five directors ought 
to be independent as mandated by the law and regulations 
of the Kingdom.219 The State, like all other holders of ordinary 
shares, has the right to vote at the Ordinary General Assem-
bly for the election of all board members other than the Pres-
ident and CEO of the Company. Similarly, the voting right of 
the State at the Ordinary General Assembly on the dismissal of 
the members of the Board can apply to independent directors 
and members who have not been nominated by it.220
Petrobras’s Board of Directors consists of a minimum of seven 
and a maximum of eleven members, elected at the General 
Shareholders Meeting for a term of up to two years, with the 
possibility of a maximum of three consecutive re-elections.221 
As the holder of least 50% plus one share of the voting capital 
of the company,222 Brazil’s Federal Government has the power 
to elect a majority of the board members.223 In addition, the 
Ministry of Economy has the right to indicate one of them.224 
The Board of Directors must be composed of at least 40% of 
independent members.225 The Executive Office includes one 
Chairperson, chosen by the Board of Directors from among its 
members, and up to eight Executive Officers, elected by the 
Board of Directors, among natural persons residing in the Bra-
zil, for a term of up to two years, with the possibility of a maxi-
mum of three consecutive re-elections; they can be dismissed 
at any time.226
Until 2009, the board of directors of Petronas was composed of 
the Director General of the Economic Planning Unit, the Gen-
eral Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, the Director of the 
Economic and Coordination Unit, and the independent ad-
vocate and solicitor. However, since 2010, the Non-Executive 
Directors are now appointed and re-appointed by the Annual 
General Meeting. All the Non-Executive Directors are consid-
ered by the Board to be wholly independent. The Malaysian 
Prime Minister appoints the chairperson of the board.227 Petro-
nas has a Board Selection Criteria and Guiding Principles for 
the Appointment/Re-appointment of Directors so as to ensure 
that the Board is refreshed timely and with the right composi-
tion. It also has an Independent Directors’ Guidelines (Guide-
lines) whereby the Independent Directors’ Review is part of 
an annual exercise. The Guidelines regulate amongst others, 
the tenure of Independent Non-Executive Directors and the 
criteria for Independent Directors. The positions and roles of 
Chairperson of the board and CEO are held by two different 
individuals in order to promote greater accountability.228 
In Sonatrach, several individuals from various Algerian minis-
tries—two from the. Ministry of Energy, two from the Ministry 
of Finance, and one from the Algerian Central Bank—serve as 
members of the board of directors, along with several of the 
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company’s senior managers and its CEO, who serves at the 
same time as chair of the board of directors.229 In turn, the Ex-
ecutive Committee consists of the chair and CEO as well as 
other senior managers of the company, including vice-presi-
dents and executive directors.230 As chair of Sonatrach’s Gen-
eral Assembly, the Ministry of Energy and Mines nominates the 
company’s chair and CEO and approves its Executive Commit-
tee. Ultimately, the Algerian president has the final say in the 
appointment of managers, vice-presidents, and other person-
nel.231 
4.2.3. Staff integrity. Does the SOE invest in staff integrity 
and capacity? (Precept 6.2.3)
NNPC
The Talent Management Department in Abuja manages staff 
training for all the strategic business units and corporate 
services units. NNPC has a Training Academy in Kaduna. 
NNPC also has a secondment arrangement for on-the-job-
training with joint venture operators, contractors and other 
partners both locally and overseas. The 2019 Benchmarking 
Report notes:232
The NNPC has one of the more robust remunerations 
and professional development structures among Nigeri-
an public service organizations. The NNPC’s Leadership 
Academy was established to provide technical, manage-
rial and executive training within and outside the corpo-
ration.
However, a survey of NNPC staff reveal difficulties in trans-
lating training into practical technical capacity and integrity 
performance. Olive Egbuta in her study on “Leadership Suc-
cession Practices and Employees’ Career Development in The 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation” surveyed a sample 
of NNPC employees and recorded the following opinions:233
There is a constant leadership changes and the way it is 
done makes the rest of the employees feel insecure and 
believe the same faith may befall them. Government in-
terference in NNPC is huge. The government decides who 
comes in and who goes out leading to staff diminishing 
commitment to the organization. [The Group Managing 
Director role] is no longer considered as career based but 
highly political, therefore it is no longer news to hear of 
sacking but routine.
The study also found that over two thirds of survey respon-
dents do not believe that NNPC has an established career 
path for employees and professional groups, or that training 
and development opportunities are explicitly linked to the 
strategic direction of NNPC.234 
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
 
The five international NOCs analyzed operate with clear rules 
and institutional frameworks for staff development and integ-
rity. In Petronas, Equinor, and Saudi Aramco, CEOs are typi-
cally promoted from within the companies, rewarding profes-
sional growth and fostering capacity building, stability, and 
longer-term thinking. In all NOCs, there are mechanisms for 
career development for staff, institutionalized integrity train-
ing and compliance frameworks, clearly defined recruitment 
processes, and plans for leadership and succession. 
Saudi Aramco makes significant contributions to the devel-
opment of human capital, with estimated expenditures of 
around USD 500 million per year on human resources. For 
example, first-year employees attend the company’s Indus-
trial Training Center in Dharan, and the most promising ones 
are awarded full scholarships for overseas training.235 Petro-
bras maintains programs that provide ethical, technical, and 
leadership training to its employees.236 In addition, it strives 
to continually improve its corporate governance and compli-
ance practices, based on codes of conduct and good practice 
as well as channels for employees and other stakeholders to 
report potential breaches.237 
Equinor’s code of conduct regulates the company’s practic-
es toward its employees (including with respect to diversity 
and privacy), operations (including guidance on avoiding 
corruption and conflicts of interests), business partners, the 
environment, and stakeholders such as governments and lo-
cal communities.238 In Petronas, executives must comply with 
good governance best practices and training requirements set 
out in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance.239 The 
company has also instituted a Code of Conduct and Business 
Ethics Guide, with guidance on conflicts of interest, fighting 
corruption, financial integrity, workplace culture, among oth-
ers.240 Sonatrach’s code of conduct of 2010 outlines the com-
pany’s values; sets out its commitments to employees, com-
mercial partners, and the environment. The code includes 
ethics norms applicable to all employees, subject to enforce-
ment by an ethics committee.241 
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4.3. SOE transparency and accountability. 
Are SOE decision-making and operations 
transparent and accountable? (Precept 6.3)
4.3.1. SOE operational and payment data. Does the SOE 
disclose key operational and payment data?  
(Precept 6.3.1)
NNPC
According to the Resource Governance Index and EITI, the 
government publicly discloses how much revenue it receives 
from NNPC, and NNPC publicly discloses how much revenue it 
transfers to the government.242 Information on NNPC’s aggre-
gate production volume is also publicly available, as is infor-
mation on its aggregate sales volume.243 But NNPC does not 
publicly disclose the amount spent on non-commercial ac-
tivities, disaggregated information on the sale of production 
by NNPC and subsidiaries (for example, beneficial ownership 
on off-takers, beneficial owners operating in commodity trad-
ing),244 or the cost of its operations.245 NNPC does not disclose 
detailed annual reports either. However, for the first time, in 
2020, NNPC disclosed the audited statement of its accounts 
and that of its subsidiaries, disclosing the state of profitability 
of profit and loss of the entire group.246 Time will tell if this be-
comes a normal and regular occurrence.
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach 
The NOCs analyzed disclose key operational and payment 
data, including, in some cases details about their subsidiaries 
to varying degrees. The extent to which the companies are list-
ed on a stock exchange with strong disclosure requirements 
or belonging to countries member to the EITI influences the 
extent of the disclosure. 
Petrobras and Equinor, being listed on stock exchanges with 
rigorous corporate reporting requirements (New York, Oslo, 
and Sao Paulo), offer an important amount of key operational 
data. Similarly, Petronas has become more transparent over 
time thanks to its bond issuance247 while some of its subsid-
iaries have been listed on the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange 
since the mid-1990s.248 For years, Saudi Aramco has been 
opaque, but in April 2019 as part of the initial public offering 
(IPO) effort, disclosed a significant amount of key operational 
data and transfers to the government.249 Sonatrach, however, 
is not listed on any stock exchange, and has ranks the lowest 
of the five NOCs analyzed in the Resource Governance Index; 
however, it still ranks higher than NNPC.250 Post-IPO disclo-
sures for Saudi Aramco remain to be seen as a result of its list-
ing on the Saudi stock exchange. 
Belonging to the only country being subject to European 
transparency directive251 and EITI compliant member, Equinor 
is tremendously more transparent than the other NOCs. Its 
disclosures detail its payments by projects in jurisdiction, 
the financial relationship between government and state 
enterprises, production volumes disaggregated by field, 
revenues from oil sales and how the oil is marketed on an 
aggregate basis.252
Irrespective of the reporting requirements to which compa-
nies are subject, they all remain not transparent enough on 
commodity trading. In addition, Sonatrach and Petrobras re-
main unclear on their transfers to the government, and all of 
the NOCs playing a non-commercial role remain unclear on 
such activities.253 
4.3.2. SOE financial reporting and audits. Does the SOE 
subject itself to independent financial audits, and 
publish the results? (Precept 6.3.2)
NNPC
The NNPC Act requires NNPC’s annual financial statements 
to be audited by an independent auditor, however NNPC has 
not regularly published the audited reports.254 NNPC has pub-
licly disclosed unaudited operational and financial data on 
a monthly basis,255 and for the first time, in 2020, NNPC pub-
lished the audited statement of its accounts included disag-
gregated by subsidiaries.256 
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach 
Of the four NOCs, the two privatized or partially privatized 
ones—Petrobras and Equinor—subject themselves to inde-
pendent financial audits and publish the results of those au-
dits, as required by the stock exchanges where they are listed. 
Petronas does not follow this practice for the parent company 
of the group, but its publicly listed subsidiaries do. Petronas 
and Saudi Aramco, which remain largely government owned, 
prepare and publish financial statements according to inter-
national financial reporting standards, but without engaging 
independent external auditors to prepare them. Petronas is 
only subjected to state auditors.257 As a result of its public of-
fering, Saudi Aramco will need to conduct independent audits 
and disclose reports to comply with stock exchange require-
ments. Sonatrach, however, subjects its financial reports to 
internal audits only, publishing the auditors’ certification.258
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4.3.3. SOE legislative oversight. Does the legislature 
oversee SOE performance without unduly 
constraining its decision making? (Precept 6.3.3)
NNPC
In exercising their role in legislating in the public interest, set-
ting national priorities and strategies, and approving govern-
ment budgets, parliamentarians need information on the im-
pact of NOCs on revenues and can help oversee the operation 
of these companies.259 NNPC is not required to submit annual 
reports to the legislature on its annual activities.260 Legislative 
oversight is reactive rather than proactive, often in response 
to allegations of wrongdoing, and has not generally led to 
accountability for wrongdoing or poor performance.261 More 
recently, in the context of the current oil crisis, Nigeria’s high 
cost of oil production and associated poor marginal profit has 
alarmed its current legislators who have demanded increased 
transparency around the cost structure. The Nigerian Senate 
has challenged NNPC to be more transparent with federally 
funded projects. 262
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach 
All five international NOCs analyzed are subject to Parliament 
oversight in some way. Petrobras is the most constrained and 
submit its budget for legislative approval and been reporting 
its performance to Brazil’s National Congress on a quarterly 
basis since 2016.263 In turn, Sonatrach, Petronas, Equinor, and 
Saudi Aramco are not required to seek government approv-
al of their budgets. Petronas shares its budget with the legis-
lature, whereas the others do not. Sonatrach only shares its 
budget with the regulatory authority, ALNAFT.264
In all companies, in exceptional cases the legislature can in-
tervene. For instance, the Norwegian State may be required to 
seek approval from the Norwegian Parliament’s (the Storting) 
before voting on certain proposals for Equinor: for instance, 
projects with important economic and social externalities, or 
costs exceeding USD 840 million265 or if Equinor issues addi-
tional shares and such issuance would significantly dilute the 
Norwegian State’s holding, or if such issuance would require 
a capital contribution from the Norwegian State in excess of 
government mandates.266
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5.  Recommendations
The persistent critical issues in NNPC’s governance have both 
hampered oil sector development and deprived Nigeria from 
public resources. The oil, climate, and COVID-19 crises and the 
ramp-up of the low-carbon transition exacerbate this reality, 
with the NOC providing sub-optimal returns to its stakehold-
ers. It is therefore time for the Nigerian government and leg-
islature to reconsider NNPC’s role in the context of the energy 
transition and accordingly implement profound reform of the 
company. While the government has been called upon many 
times in the past to reform NNPC,267 the current crisis provides 
a unique opportunity and political momentum to forge ahead 
with much-needed reform to avoid long-term damage to the 
country. 
We encourage the Nigerian government to take the following 
practical steps:
1. Hire experts to develop an energy transition plan 
for Nigeria. The plan to be developed must assess how 
to phase out the exploitation of oil and avoid the as-
set-stranding risk, developing a feasible and bankable 
roadmap for the exploitation of associated gas during the 
remaining exploitation of oil, and analyzing the type of re-
newable energy generation deployment that is necessary 
to satisfy the country’s energy needs (utility scale, home 
systems, mini grid, among others).
2. Run an institutional analysis of the role to be played 
by each key public or private institution in the energy 
transition. Defining what role NNPC could usefully play 
in the energy transition means understanding the roles 
of the other key actors as well, such as national power 
utilities, the ministry of energy, private investors in power 
generation, technology and research institutions, inter-
national donors, and international and national banks. 
Responsibilities should be clearly allocated and institu-
tions’ roles defined accordingly.
3. Fundamentally reform NNPC, or privatize. NNPC can-
not play a useful role in the energy transition without 
deep reform seeking, in particular, to make it indepen-
dent from political interference at all operational and 
management levels, reduce opportunities for corruption, 
enshrine transparency and internal as well as external 
oversight in NNPC’s governance framework, build capac-
ity within the company to operate in the renewable ener-
gy sector, and legally clarify its funding mechanism and 
revenue retention model. As is done in the utility sector, 
the government could also sign a management contract 
with clear performance indicators with NNPC. Public list-
ing of the company on a stock exchange is an avenue to 
consider. If such profound reform is not feasible for lack 
of political champions inside the government or within 
NNPC, a better avenue would be to privatize NNPC or at 
least some of its subsidiaries.
4. Include principles of climate change governance in the 
NNPC reform agenda. Whether NNPC remains a public 
entity or is privatized, the government should impose cli-
mate change governance principles as recommended by 
TPI (see annex) on NNPC’s management (and any other 
company operating in an emission-intensive industry). 
5. Consider setting up a separate strategic division of 
NNPC or in case of NNPC privatization, an independent 
entity with clearly delineated objectives and responsibil-
ities focused on the low-carbon energy transition.
a. Organizational and strategic objectives: Consid-
er whether and how the division or entity should 
focus on:
• Reducing carbon emission from existing and fu-
ture oil and gas projects;
• Planning how to limit the number and type oil 
and gas projects to facilitate the low-carbon 
transition;
• Developing new business in renewable energy;
• Coordinating with private investors or with other 
government agencies;
• Ensuring alignment of activities with the objec-
tives of the Paris Agreement and Nigeria’s cli-
mate commitments; among others.
To prevent vested interests from stalling progress, 
the division or entity should be staffed with new hires 
with relevant skills and experience, including, for ex-
ample, entrepreneurship, small businesses, venture 
capital, customer service and marketing, logistics, 
environmental economics, change management, 
project management, environmental science, infor-
mation technology, among others.
b. Organizational processes: Aspects to be considered 
include:
• Establishing clear and relevant target metrics 
and performance results that are closely tied 
with the objectives of the entity and its role in the 
energy transition. Results should be made pub-
licly available, independently audited, and used 
in evaluating effectiveness, such as: 
o Carbon intensity trajectory as compared to 
Paris Agreement–aligned emissions path-
ways;
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o Quantity of methane leaks and gas flaring 
from oil and gas production;
o Number of oil and gas fields with carbon 
capture and storage;
o Number and percentage of households with 
home-based solar systems;
o Percentage of overall power generation us-
ing renewables, natural gas, heat recovery 
systems, and carbon capture;
o Percentage of building consumption using 
electricity, natural gas, and heat recovery 
systems;
o Percentage of transportation consumption 
using electricity, liquefied petroleum gas, 
sustainable biofuels, and carbon capture.
• Establishing a compliance timeline for existing 
fields to stop gas flaring, control methane leaks, 
eliminate the use of diesel to power operations 
and facilities, make mandatory the use associat-
ed gas or renewable energies, and establish car-
bon emission standards. 
• Assessing the stranded asset risk and on this ba-
sis, establishing strict criteria for approvals of 
new oil and gas projects. These should include: 
prohibiting gas flaring, withdrawing fiscal in-
centives, and ensuring methane leak controls 
in place. New oil and gas projects should not in-
crease Nigeria’s stranded asset risk.
• Establishing an independent oversight agency 
for contracting processes and awards, subjected 
to public disclosure requirements. 
c. Funding: Funding sources for this new division or en-
tity should be identified in advance and in ways that 
incentivize desired results. The following options 
could be considered:
•	 	Establishing a formula for the specific source of 
funding for this division or entity, for example, 
from existing petroleum revenues, but with that 
source declining over time in order to avoid in-
centivizing more oil production. Funding from 
oil revenues would be replaced over time as the 
new division or entity achieves its commercial 
objectives and becomes self-sustaining.
• Establishing joint ventures or funding mecha-
nisms with Niger Delta Power Holding Company 
(NDPHC), NNPC’s RED and Gas and Power di-
visions, the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the 
European Union, USAID’s Power Africa and pri-
vate investors (such as the renewable energy 
divisions of the International Oil Companies) to 
assist with new energy transition projects and to 
assist smaller Nigerian oil companies with car-
bon emission compliance.
Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition 
30  |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
6.  Conclusion 
In contrast to the governments of Algeria, Brazil, Malaysia, 
Norway, and Saudi Arabia, the Nigerian government cannot 
yet rely on NNPC to harness the energy transition. NNPC’s en-
ergy transition program is weak and lacks strategic and oper-
ational means. 
Moreover, the government cannot rely on NNPC to be an oil 
and gas market player for the remaining time before fossil fu-
els become stranded. Its cost of extraction is too high for to-
day’s price levels, and its carbon intensity is higher than the 
global average, which is problematic for the environment as 
well as on a commercial basis as worldwide carbon pricing 
initiatives proliferate.
It is therefore imperative for NNPC to seize the energy transi-
tion as a business opportunity to save itself as well as Nigeria 
from its oil dependence. However, NNPC can only do so if it 
embarks on a long overdue reform of its governance. The dis-
closure of NNPC’s audits that occurred in early 2020 for the 
first time in its history is a promising sign that the company 
may be turning a corner.
The experience and governance systems of the five NOCs re-
viewed for this report should not be followed blindly,268 as 
many of them should also considerably improve their gover-
nance and energy transition strategies. Even so, they remain 
ahead of NNPC in both areas and as such can serve as bench-
marks or, at the very least, sources of inspiration. 
Moreover, the benchmarking framework developed by the 
NRC for the governance of NOCs used in this report and that of 
TPI to assess the quality of the climate and energy transition 
governance and management (see Annex 1) are invaluable 
tools to guide the reform of the NNPC. We hope that these 
frameworks and the comparative experiences highlighted will 
support reflection around much-needed NNPC reform.
As Nigerian policymakers focus on mitigating the fallout from 
the painful recession triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic 
reform of NNPC should fall near the very top of the agenda. 
Such efforts will position NNPC to sustainably contribute to 
Nigeria’s economy and energy independence in the long term. 
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Annex: TPI Questionnaire
Level 0: Unaware of Climate Change as a Business Issue
1. Does the company acknowledge climate change as a significant issue for the business?
Level 1: Acknowledging Climate Change as a Business Issue
2. Does the company recognize climate change as a relevant risk and/or opportunity for the business?
3. Does the company have a policy (or equivalent) commitment to action on climate change?
Level 2: Building Capacity
4. Has the company set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets?
5. Has the company published information on its Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions?
Level 3: Integrating into Operational Decision Making
6. Has the company nominated a board member or board committee with explicit responsibility for oversight of the climate change 
policy?
7. Has the company set quantitative targets for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions?
8. Does the company report on Scope 3 emissions?
9. Has the company had its operational (Scope 1 and/or 2) greenhouse gas emissions data verified?
10. Does the company support domestic and international efforts to mitigate climate change?
11. Does the company disclose its membership and involvement in trade associations engaged in climate issues?
12. Does the company have a process to manage climate-related risks?
13. Does the company disclose Scope 3 use of product emissions?
Level 4: Strategic Assessment
14. Has the company set long-term quantitative targets for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions?
15. Does the company’s remuneration for senior executives incorporate climate change performance?
16. Does the company incorporate climate change risks and opportunities in their strategy?
17. Does the company undertake climate scenario planning?
18. Does the company disclose an internal price of carbon?
19. Does the company ensure consistency between its climate change policy and the positions taken by trade associations of which 
it is a member?
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